I consumed some great content this week. Granted, some of it (#2) is “great” only in a sense of provoking discussion and sharpening one’s objections, rather than for its own merits. But I hope you enjoy it nonetheless:
- Life Sucks (YouTube): Re: Depression – The Invisible Cause? (Feb 2019)
(28 min audio)
I have nothing to add to this response video. It pretty much nails it. Best thing I’ve heard in weeks. - Philosophy Bites: Anne Phillips on Multiculturalism (July 2007)
(16 min audio)
This is my first anti-pick that’s worth sharing here. In a few words, this is what nuanced multiculturalism looks like: Liberalism. If I wasn’t so lazy, I would’ve written a blog post about it and named it “Multiculturalism: The More Reasonable, The Less Multicultural” (in a not-so-subtle reference to this old favorite). But seriously: in what way does so-called “multiculturalism” of Anne Phillips differ from liberalism, not only new but classical? Why do we need to obnoxiously chest-thump about how multicultural we are if 1) we don’t even believe in culture and 2) liberalism covers most, if not all, of the issues raised? - MCCS (YouTube): Pereboom and Dennett on Basic Deserts and Moral responsibility (Sep 2014)
(18 min video)
An interesting back and forth between perhaps the two most prominent living advocates of incompatibilism and compatibilism, respectively. I’m starting to warm up to what Dennett is trying to say, but I can’t shake off the feeling that he’s engaging in wishful thinking. I agree that it would be nice to live in a world where promises are real, and punishments/rewards are deserved, and that we are really liable for our behavior, but how does that bear on what is true? Furthermore, competence doesn’t entail freedom; I’ll let you think of counter-examples. I can agree with Dan that competence matters and warrants differential treatment on both consequentialist and contractual grounds, without thereby granting that the competent therefore act freely. The game metaphor, however, makes total sense to me: we enjoy our membership in the Moral Agent Club, and we want to be treated as if we are free, so we devise rules to help facilitate that. But just because something matters to us deeply, even if our civilization depends on it, doesn’t make it really real. But then, maybe that “real” thing that doesn’t exist doesn’t actually matter, so the compatibilist is right after all.
I’ll stop before I write an entire post on this. But I’d want to recommend that channel. It’s run by the philosophy department of Moscow State University. Apart from short ~15 min clips, it has a number of fascinating interviews with well-known thinkers like Pat Churchland, Chalmers, Prinz, Fisher, Dennett, Pereboom, etc. I’ve been trying to get thru their content for months.
Well, this is not as effortful as I expected. It feels somewhat therapeutic without being too demanding quality-wise, so I might actually keep it up. No “promises”, but I anticipate that more picks will be coming next week!
Analytic Inferences 
Is it bad/arrogant that I reflexively assumed you were referencing that old video of mine, before even considering following the link to see for myself? Or does the similarity in titles get me off the hook?
Funny you raise multi-culti stuff here, as I *just finished* a watching painfully bad interview of Jared Taylor by Fareed Zakaria. I swear, Taylor is genius in selecting who interviews him. In every example I’ve seen, the interviewer fumbles the follow-up challenge to Taylor’s stock concerns.
Going to watch #3 now. Looking forward to seeing these two cover this ground, as I’ve gradually warmed up to a “fairness is intrinsically relevant” clause (not grounded in preferences for fairness, or any other indirect road to fairness; just fairness itself) and I really want it to differ from traditional “desert” theories. But maybe that’s impossible, and concerns over fairness are boringly interchangeable with those of desert. Either way, no more pure welfarism for me.
Definitely keep doing these. Wish you had more than three this week though. Deadline absolutism I guess.
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I don’t think that was bad/arrogant: the title of that video is pretty unique and clever. I haven’t encountered a title of the form “X: the more improved, the less X” anywhere except for that video. So I think you’re off the hook. Besides, it was my intention to remind about that video anyone who remembers it.
Any thoughts on #3?
I had a lot to say regarding your remarks about fairness, and in a universe where I am a better version of myself, I probably have written a post or even made a video about it. Alas, as it so often happens, I missed the chance when I was passionate enough about it. Now the most I can produce is a comment response with a few trains of thoughts, but I suppose that’s better than nothing.
I am sympathetic to the idea of fairness having intrinsic value. If you could spell out how you think it differs from desert, and why you’re not so fond of desert theories, I’ll have more to say. I am curious about what you think fairness is, and whether it can avoid the leveling down objection. The genetic lottery leaves some people much worse off than others, and this unfairness is one of the things that makes it repugnant. But suppose that the genetic
lotteryleft everyone equally bad. Would that be more fair? I hate to say it, but that seems more horrible but also less unfair. Nobody is discriminated against arbitrarily, etc. So maybe fairness is an intrinsic value, but welfare trumps it?I didn’t read anything on this topic, but my first attempt to define fairness would be something like a relational, cumulative desert-responsiveness over time. This means accounting not just for present and future outcomes, but also taking into account what happened in the past. I think there is a tention between prioritizing future (or past) and a four-dimensionalism about time anyway: if there is nothing ontologically special about the “now” (any more than there’s something special about the “here”), and “now” is just a time slot like any other (past or future), then what is the justification for ignoring past wrongs and misdeeds? To treat people fairly is therefore to distribute benefits to them in a way that takes into account their entire persistences. Suppose one of the two siblings was sick a lot during their childhood, whereas the other was never sick, and now both are at a zero welfare. You can give 1) the no-longer-sick one 1000 utils, or 2) the never-sick one 1001 utils. Suppose that each sibling’s satisfaction/util ratio is the same. If you’re solely future-oriented, you have to choose option 2. But I would choose option 1 to make it more fair. I don’t mind trading off some welfare in order to significantly improve fairness.
There’s also a relational component to fairness that doesn’t seem to be necessary in desert theories. I don’t think that an outcome with a single person can be fair or unfair. It can suck or not suck, and it can be deserved or undeserved, but it’s only fair/unfair if two or more beings (and probably only persons) are involved.
I’ve actually been struggling with finding enough good content to fill these picks, but that’s because I’m temporarily very busy. Hopefully it’ll be normalized soon.
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